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THE ART AND SCIENCE OF THE (SURVIVAL) DEAL:
THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC AGAINST
UNREASONABLE RISKS
Irma S. Russell*
In the not-too-distant past, some toothpaste on the American market
included a dose of uranium among its ingredients.' Modem readers may view this
statement with disbelief, seeing uranium poisoning as an unreasonable risk that
government, rather than consumers, should discover. In other words, the
inefficiency of individual research means the role of researching and assessing
such risks should fall to the government. Consumers today have a general sense
that unreasonably dangerous substances should not be on the market-providing
its danger is significant enough and there are no offsetting benefits.
Accurate information is needed for good decisions, and this point plays an
important role in the market. While one view of public ordering might be that the
market will correct (ultimately) for such dangers, this kind of market correction
needs deaths and injuries and publicity of those negative outcomes to effect
change. Accordingly, whether decisions are private (resulting from individual
assent under contract law) or public (resulting from law or regulation),
misrepresented or inaccurate information is a basis for undoing either private or
public deals. Discovery of a material inaccuracy justifies corrective action under
law in either context. The unwinding of the private deal is available if a court finds
rescission of the deal is justified. Likewise, regulations found to be based on
inaccurate information are subject to revision.
Science, the systematic discovery of the facts of our world and universe,
is an ongoing process of gaining knowledge of "general truths or the operation of
general laws."2 It is a "system of knowledge concerned with the physical world
and its phenomena" 3 and necessarily includes revision of inaccuracies. Science
has long been the fulcrum of important issues on both legislation and regulation to
protect health.' Once science establishes that uranium is not good for us, things
change. Both contracts and regulations that rely on the inaccurate assumption that
* Professor of Law and Edward A. Smith/Missouri Chair in Law, the Constitution, and Society,
University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. The author thanks Professors John Ragsdale
and Thomas L. Russell for their insights and gratefully acknowledges the able research assistance of
Dakota Paris, Solon McGee, Brenna Houston, and Vemexi Ruiz De Chavez. Errors, of course, are
my own.
1See RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE AToMIC BOMB 283, 286 (1986); see also BILL BRYSON,
A SHORT HISTORY OF NEARLY EVERYTHING 113 (2003) (noting radioactive thorium was an ingredient
in toothpaste until 1938); see generallyPaul W. Frame, Radioactive CurativeDevices andSpas, OAK
RIDGE Assoc. U., http://www.orau.org/ptp/articlesstories/quackstory.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2018)
(discussing the incorporation of radioactive materials into various consumer products).
2 Science, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/science
(last visited
Dec. 17, 2018).
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Air Quality Criteria and Control Techniques, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2018) (directing
Administrator to issue air quality criteria for air pollutants which, "in his judgment, cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare").
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uranium is good for people must change in light of the new information. Contracts
to put uranium in toothpaste are voidable; legislatures and agencies promulgate
regulations to protect against the now-identified risk. Such change is not automatic,
of course. Prioritizing risks to protect the public takes time. For example,
currently over 80,000 toxic chemicals are "available for use today are on the
market without any safety review or testing."' Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
recently brought attention to the issue of testing omissions under the Toxic
Substances Control Act required by remedial legislation passed two years ago.'
The central thesis of this Article is that accurate information-presented
by facts and science-is the bedrock of all decision making and, in fact, requisite
to survival. The corollary is that inaccurate information (faulty science) results in
flawed decisions. These principles apply to decisions whether the decisions are in
the realm of private ordering (commonly referred to as "deals") or in the realm of
public policy, such as agency regulations. The Article proceeds in five additional
parts. Part II considers the core government function of protecting the public
welfare, including the health and safety of the people. Part III identifies accuracy
of information, i.e. science, as the irreducible minimum in decisions under the
imprimatur of the law, ranging from the private ordering of the deals between
individuals (contract law) to the public law of environmental regulation. Part IV
summarizes the evolution of protections against environmental dangers, including
global climate disruption as the existential example of the need for governmental
action. Part V explores the Trump administration's response to climate disruption.
Part VI concludes with observations about the art and science of the deal
administrative agencies must fulfill. In their delegated role under environmental
laws, agencies and the government must protect the public's right to a climate
system capable of sustaining human life as fundamental to a free and ordered
society.7
I. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT: FURTHERING PUBLIC WELFARE
The core role of government is to promote the public welfare. Pointedly,
the founding documents encapsulate the public good as the reason for government,
and the Constitution, statutory law, and the common law all reflect the
governmental role of protection of society and people. The Latin phrase "Salus
populi suprema lex esto" ("Let the good (or safety) of the people be the supreme
(or highest) law)" captures the point. Legal values are public values-like those
of other disciplines and professions. Moreover, logic requires this legal point. Can
it be the purpose to serve a particular group in preference over the public good?
See Sheldon Whitehouse, The EPA Scandal You May Have Missed: Reflections on Two Years of

the LautenbergAct, BLOOMBERG LAW: ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY (July 2, 2018),
http://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/insight-the-epa-scandal-you-may-have-missedreflections-on-two-years-of-the-lautenberg-act
6

Id
See Julianav. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016) (stating the court's judgment

that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered
society).
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Both private and public law must pass the test of service to the public good. If the
good of the people is not the purpose of a law, it lacks justification. The purpose
of public protection is easy to see in areas such as hazardous waste law or
environmental law in general. Clearly the justification for environmental law is
protection of people, a core government responsibility. Even when we label an area
"private law," however, the test of public benefit still applies.' Like all law, the
expectation of contract law-even the most private category of law-is that it
exists in service to the public good. 9 Contract law creates a legal system that
recognizes promises as enforceable rights. Its default principle of expectancy
damages secures substitution damages, furthering the public good (enhanced
markets) under any theory of contract.'o Although the enhanced wealth of a
particular transaction may be minimal, the overall effect is security for the market
and, thus, for deals. The concept of economic efficiency itself is justified on the
basis of social benefit. Indeed, in its general sense, efficiency is often used to
reference the "good" for the public."
II. FACTS AND SCIENCE: THE IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM OF
DECISION MAKING
Both public and private law is the accuracy of the information relied on by
decision makers. Simply put, reliable decisions require reliable information. This
is true for actions within human control (e.g., contracting or deal-making) and for
actions in which humans interact with the natural world. When the legislature
delegates work to agencies, it often leaves details and judgment calls to the agency.
For example, in the context of environmental laws, agencies articulate and apply
8 See

James D. Cox, CorporateLaw and the Limits ofPrivate Ordering, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 257,

261 (2015) (explaining the imprecision of the labeling contract law as private law and comparing the
public aspects of corporate law).
9 Contract law serves the public good by stimulating markets. See, e.g., Leon E. Trakman, Public
Responsibilities Beyond Consent: Rethinking Contract Theory, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217 (2016)

(reasoning that the consent of private parties to contract ought to "surpass restrictive conceptions of
equity that focus wholly on corrective injustice between contracting parties at the expense of public
deterrence"); Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and ContractLaw at the Dawn of the
VirtualAge, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 264 (2007) (arguing for recognition of the underlying policy rationale
to increase the public good of copyright law); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach ofA Treaty and
Rationalist InternationalRelations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of
Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1997) (applying rationale of the

public good to the law of treaties toward a goal of international public good).
10 The two dominant theories of "will" or "reliance" can be found in the historic literature about
contracting. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). For a

modern assessment of contract theory and the public good, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Contracting
with ElectronicAgents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047 (2001) (describing historic conceptions of contract law

and applying the test of the public good to exchanges by electronic agents).
" Discussion Upon Canons of Ethics, 33 A.B.A Rep. 55-86, Preamble (1908) (noting that "In
America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of government rests upon the approval
of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing Justice be
developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have absolute
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration").
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this balance using science to identify dangers and risks. To fulfill its mission "to
protect human health and the environment,"12 the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") implements legislation under its regulatory and enforcement
powers. Private research lacks the imprimatur of law and the power of legal
enforcement in the public good. The agency provides permits to those seeking to
extract valuable resources from the land or to input pollution into the commons
upon a judgment that the permit sought is not outweighed by the risks occasioned
to the public. Of necessity, the EPA and other federal and state agencies assess
scientific evidence to make decisions that affect the health and safety of people in
the U.S. Likewise, judicial review of agency regulations and other decisions also
reflect reliance on science and the judgment of agencies.13 From a practical
perspective, science in decision-making seems inevitable. How can the
government expend public funds without scientific reason to justify the
expenditure? To take a simple example, if a village considers redesigning its water
system, how can it know the need for upgrading exists without science? Without
the scientific understanding of danger or risk, how do we assess dangers? How can
a village decide to ameliorate a problem with its water quality? Regulating
unreasonable risks presents a balance of science and policy. Science identifies the
likelihood of harms accompanying a substance or activity. Policy determinations
choose how or whether to regulate the risk of harm. Agency action must be
substantiated by scientific data. The use of the most accurate information available
is the irreducible minimum for all legitimate decision making.
Only science presented in good faith and based on objective facts can play
its important role reliably. Given this imperative, the task of insulating scientific
conclusions from political interference is apparent. Good decisions-i.e.,
decisions that protect public health and safety-are possible only when objective
science is the foundation of policy making. Knowledgeable scientists and
14
authorities must make informed judgments based on the relevant science.
Science is the background, but policy and politics also play a part in the calculous
12 See About EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa (last visited Dec.
17, 2018).
13 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (applying deference

to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory mandates). The Court's re-evaluation of Chevron
deference in Mead and other cases indicates a greater focus on the essential function of Article III
judges should not be seen as an abandonment of science as the necessary objective basis for
judgments about risks. See, e.g., Eric Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Retreatfrom Chevron Principlesin United States v. Mead,
107 DICK. L. REV. 289 (2002) (examining less deferential standard toward agency decision-making);
William Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1173 (2008) (noting

judicial recognition that courts "know very little about the intricacies of environmental science"
among other areas).
14 See, e.g., JAMES MCCARTHY & KATE SHOUSE,
CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERv., R43092,
IMPLEMENTING

EPA's

2015

OZONE

AIR

QUALITY

STANDARDS,

at

6

(2015),

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43092.pdf (noting that Bush EPA Administrator considered agency
recommendations "and his own judgment regarding the strength of the science" in finalizing ozone
standard); see also Russell S. Jutlah, Economic Theory and the Environment, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 19-20 (2001).
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of decision-making and in the line-drawing required. Why ban uranium in
toothpaste but not cigarettes? Arsenic but not alcohol? As economists enjoy
saying, there are "always trade-offs" in laws and regulations and "winners and
losers."" Practical issues such as historical deference to personal choice (such as
whether to smoke) also play a role. As a bottom line, good outcomes must be
based on sound science, even when policy judgments may legitimately moderate
the ultimate decision of an agency. The EPA makes this point regarding regulations
it promulgates under the canon of environmental law. For example, the EPA
"regulates pesticides to ensure that they do not pose unreasonable risks to human
health or the environment."" In doing so, "EPA scientists and analysts carefully
review these data to determine whether to register (license) a pesticide product for
use and whether specific restrictions are necessary. "17
Scientific inquiry has operated as the sine qua non of regulatory action to
protect public health and safety since the beginnings of environmental regulation,
and perhaps since the beginning of regulation. From the late 1960s to the 1980s,
public opinion demanded environmental protections." Congress responded with
the canon of acts protecting people and the environment, developing a network of
environmental laws and treaties to attempt to deal with a wide array of
environmental issues. For example, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and
the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") sought to control the release of harmful substances into the air, water
and soil. One measure of an administration's support of science in policy making
is the independence of scientists.19

[T]he use of science in government is now under threat from multiple
fronts .

. .

. The early days of the Trump Administration have already

raised new concerns. Executive orders, cabinet appointments of
individuals with little expertise and clear conflicts of interest, and a
sympathetic Congress all create new threats to the government's ability
to make science-informed policy decisions.20

1 See, e.g., Interview with William Hogan, TSECONOMIST, http://tseconomist.com/archive/decenber2014/interview-with-william-hogan/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
16 Overview of Risk Assessment in the Pesticide Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/pesticide-science-and-assessing-pesticide-risks/overview-risk-assessmentpesticide-program (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (explaining its mission "requires extensive test data
from pesticide producers that demonstrate pesticide products can be used without causing harm to
human health and the environment"); see generally Role of Science at EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/research/role-science-epa (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
17 Understanding the Science Behind EPA 's Pesticide Decisions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/understanding-science-behind-epas-pesticide-decisions
(last updated May 24, 2017).
18 For a detailed overview of the twentieth century environmental movement in the United States,
see PHILLIP SHABECOFF, AFIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (2003).
" See, e.g., Gretchen Goldman et al., Risks to Science-BasedPolicy Under the TrumpAdministration,
47 STETSON L. REV. 267, 267-69 (2018) (detailing evidence of federal scientists the Bush
Administration altering data, disparaging scientists, and ignoring science).
20 Id.
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Agencies rely on scientific data in a variety of contexts for administrative
policies and decisions, especially when promulgating regulations that relate to
public health and safety. Indeed, many statutes expressly mandate that agency
determinations be based on reliable scientific and commercial data. 2 1 The
delegation doctrine recognizes that agencies have the power to make decisions
only to the extent that Congress has delegated that power to them.22 A corollary
to this principle of agency authority is that an agency must act in accordance with
the delegation. In other words, the agency does not have the authority to delay
indefinitely an effective date of an earlier rule pending reconsideration.23 In Clean
Air Council v. Pruitt, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the EPA's decision to reconsider
its final rule on fugitive emissions of methane and other pollutants.24 The court
held that an agency has authority to reconsider final regulations, but that such
reconsideration (like any action) must comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). 25 The court rejected EPA's argument that it has "inherent authority"
to stay the final rule during reconsideration without a notice and comment,26
pointing to the axiomatic fact that "administrative agencies may act only pursuant
to authority delegated to them by Congress."27
The importance of science to agency policy and decision making is clear
from the APA review provisions, which authorize the judiciary to "hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be" "arbitrary [or]
capricious" or "unsupported by substantial evidence." 28 While courts afford
agencies significant deference, the failure of an agency to provide reliable
scientific support for its decisions can result in judicial reversal of those
decisions.29 Courts look for "reasonable extrapolations" and "reliable data." 30 The
EPA's statement entitled "Pesticide Registration: Understanding the Science
behind the EPA's Pesticide Decisions" states the generally accepted philosophy of
science in the agency's decision-making process. It states:
21 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018) (requiring "best scientific and commercial data
available" to list species as endangered or threatened under Endangered Species Act); 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(2) (2018) (requiring "best scientific and commercial data available" for critical habitat
designation).
22 See Commodity Futures Trading Comn'nv. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847-49 (1986).
23 See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 111 (2d Cir.
2018) (holding agencies do not hold categorical authority to delay an effective date of an earlier rule
pending reconsideration); Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding agency
decision to reconsider rule does not create authority to indefinitely delay rule pending
reconsideration).
24 CleanAir Council, 862 F.3d at 8-9.
25
Id. at 9.
26 Id. (citing Nat. Res. Def. Councilv. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 202 (2d Cir. 2004)).
27 Id. (citing Verizonv. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
28 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), (2)(e) (2018).
29 See, e.g., Genuine Parts Co. v. EPA, 890 F.3d 304, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to consider scientific data that did not support its decision in
CERCLA listing of waste site); Simmons v. Smith, 888 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding
"agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts and the choice made." (quoting Nat'l Parks
Conservation Ass'nv. McCarthy, 816 F.3d 989, 994 ( 8 th Cir. 2016))).
30 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Councilv. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Science is the backbone of the EPA's decision-making. The Agency's
ability to pursue its mission to protect human health and the environment
depends upon the integrity and quality of the science on which it relies.
The environmental policies, decisions, guidance, and regulations that
impact the lives of all Americans must be grounded, at a most
31
fundamental level, in sound, high quality science.

The public has come to depend on the EPA and other agencies to assess costs and
benefits of regulation.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court noted the judgment calls
entrusted to agencies generally and to the EPA in the case of the Clean Air Act.3 2
Additionally, the Court framed the responsibility of agencies to fulfill
congressional directions and delegations:
While the statute conditions EPA action on its formation of a
"judgment," that judgment must relate to whether an air pollutant
"cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." § 7601(a)(1). Under
the Act's clear terms, EPA can avoid promulgating regulations only if it
determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or
if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not
33
exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.

The Supreme Court's determination that EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse
gases violated the Clean Air Act rested on the Court's finding that EPA's policy
judgments were not a justifiable exercise of its discretion under the CAA.34 The
Court emphasized that the agency refused to exercise its judgment as dictated by
the CAA and, instead, offered a "laundry list" of reasons for choosing not to
regulate in this area.3 5 The court concluded that the agency judgments did not
justify the agency's refusal "to form a scientific judgment."3 6 It also emphasized
EPA's duty to either regulate the area or explain the lack of scientific certainty
necessary to regulate greenhouse gases:
If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from
making a reasoned judgment, it must say so. The statutory question is
whether sufficient information exists for it to make an endangerment
finding. Instead, EPA rejected the rulemaking petition based on

31 Pesticide Registration, U.S.
ENVNTL. PROTECT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/pesticideregistration/understanding-science-behind-epas-pesticide-decisions (last updated May 24, 2017).
32 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006).
33
Id. at 533.
34
35
36

Id at 532-33.
Id. at 533.
Id at 534.
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impermissible considerations. Its action was therefore "arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 37

The malleability of science to judgment calls on level of risk acceptable
means that a significant level of trust underpins agency action. An expectation of
"sound science" suggests certainty and objectivity despite the potential for using
science to support a pre-determined position. The judgment of "sound science" or
"junk science" frames the way the agency presents its decisions.
Talk of science raises the expectation that decisions will be determined
by objective criteria, solid empirical data and rational analysis. Nearly
everyone believes that society is better off when governmental
interventions into private market arrangements to protect health, safety
and the environment are driven by sound science, rather than unfounded
emotions. 38

The scope and range of topics of scientific study is stunning, and earth's resources
are connected in intricate and unknown ways.39
Environmental risk management is an area of public policy where
science plays a vital role in revealing the health effects associated with
human exposure to different substances. It is also an area, however,
where agencies have often exaggerated the role of science and thus have
escaped their responsibility to give careful reasons for the value
judgments implicit in their decision making. 40
Nowhere are the stakes higher for the need for sound science than in environmental
regulations in general and the threat of climate change specifically.
III. THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

'

Today, climate change is the most publicized environmental threat.
Indeed, in Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court emphasized the objective
evidence about the danger of climate change, noting "the harms associated with
climate change are serious and well recognized." 4
37 Id. at 534-35 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)).
38 Thomas McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: ScienceBased Strategiesfor Avoiding Accountability and Responsibilityfor Risk-Producing Products and
Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 898 (2004) (explaining the appeal to science to justify decisions
influenced by economics).
39 See, e.g., Theresa Laverty, Could Bats Guide Humans to Clean Drinking Water in Places Where
It's Scarce?, TE CONVERSATION (May 2, 2018 6:41 AM), http://theconversation.com/could-batsguide-humans-to-clean-drinking-water-in-places-where-its-scarce-90311.
40 Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2004).
41 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521 (citing EPA reports detailing "severe and irreversible
changes to natural ecosystems" which, inter alia, produce a host of direct and indirect economic
consequences).
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The scientific consensus about the threat of climate disruption continues
to grow based on both quantitative research and observable conditions. There are
signs that governments and entrepreneurs are seeking to respond to the climate
change issue. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
has documented climate change and the accompanying disruption of rising sea
levels. 42 Nearly 200 countries entered the Paris Agreement to implement limits on
greenhouse gas emissions. 43 The scientific consensus about climate change grows
stronger as a result of additional scientific research and, additionally, because
observable conditions on the ground have worsened.4 4 Coastal areas and islands
are likely to disappear into the ocean, and large land masses may be rendered
uninhabitable because of inordinate temperature rises.4 5
Moreover, advances in the technological feasibility of limiting carbon
emissions or removing them from the atmosphere suggest possible breakthroughs
in addressing climate disruption.4 ' In the summer of 2017, the U.S. Global Change
Research Program Climate Science Special Report ("CSSR") completed a special
science section of the National Climate Assessment in response to congressional
mandate .' Finding stronger evidence of "rapid, human-caused warming of the
global atmosphere and ocean," 48 the report shows the continuing accumulation of
science on the issue, adding to the existing consensus that climate change threatens
public welfare, implicating national security as well as the environment. 4 9
42 See generally John A. Church et al., Sea Level Change, in U.N. INTERGOV'TL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1137 (Stocker et al. eds., 2013).
43 See Mythili Sampathkumar & Harry Cockburn, Syria Signs ParisAgreement Leaving US Only

Country in the World to Refuse Climate Change Deal, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 7, 2015, 2:27 PM),

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/niiddle-east/syria-paris-agreement-us-climate-changedonald-trump-world-country-accord-a8041996.html; see also U.N. FRAMEWORK CONV. ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, KYOTO PROTOCOL REFERENCE MANUAL: ON ACCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED
AMOUNT (2008); U.N. INThRGOV'TL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS
REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2014); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, CLIMATE
SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I (Donald Wuebbles

et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter CSSR 2017 REPORT].
44 See, e.g., Geoff Brumfiel, U.S. Already Feeling Consequences of Global Warming, Draft Report
Finds, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 8, 2017, 3:27 PM), http://n.pr/2umonjt (reporting from agencies such
as the National Air and Space Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, stating "that the world has warmed by about 1.6 degrees Fahrenheit over the past
150 years and that human activity is the primary cause for that warming").
45
See JustinWorland, Climate Change Will Make PartsofSouth Asia Unlivableby 2100, Study Says,
TIME (Aug. 2, 2017). http://time.com/4884648/climate-change-india-temperatures/.
46 See Wendy Jacobs & Michael Craig, Legal Pathways to Widespread Carbon Capture and
Sequestration, 47 ENVNTL. L. REPORTER 11022, 11024, 11040-46 (2017) (projecting carbon capture

and sequestration facilities can play major role in reducing greenhouse gas by 80% by 2050); see
also Henry Brean, Old Nevada Mines May Get New Leases on Life as Solar Arrays, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL (June 27, 2018) http://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-nevada/old-nevadamines-may-get-new-leases-on-life-as-solar-arrays/a (reporting that Nevada added "renewable energy

development and storage" to listing of post-production uses for shuttered mines for adoption by the
Nevada Legislative Commission).
47 See CSSR 2017 REPORT, supra note 43.
48

49

Id. at 12.

See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 41 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10695 (2011) (noting consensus regarding climate change and link to national
security); see also John D. Banusiewicz, Climate Change Can Affect Security Environment, Hagel
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Similarly, a recent study found that the rate of melt in Antarctica has tripled in the
last decade, contributing to rising sea levels."o The dangers posed to the physical
world today are related and interconnected, and climate change exacerbates the
problems.
The cycles and interdependence of all aspects of the physical
environment are confounding."
In response to climate disruption, leading companies and utilities are
taking precautions against the developing threat. Many are pushing to increase the
renewable energy mix in their fuel sources.52 Interest in large-scale wind and other
renewable projects has grown dramatically in recent years, and the path for
developing such projects under current regulations has become more permissive.53
At the same time, however, the federal government is rolling back regulations from
the Obama administration and earlier decades of environmental legislation and
regulation. Proposed tariffs from the Trump Administration would hamper
development of solar energy, 4 increasing carbon dioxide and prompting climate
experts to advocate for a hard cap on carbon dioxide concentrations." These
rollbacks are occurring despite recent reports confirming that humans are the
primary cause of global climate change." A recent scientific report by thirteen
federal agencies declares that humans are the primary cause of global warming, a
statement in direct conflict with the Trump administration's position on climate
change. 7 According to the report, sixteen of the past seventeen years are the
warmest years on global record." Weather catastrophes, which may become
Says,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
DEFENSE
NEWS
(Oct.
12,
2014),
http://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603437/climate-change-can-affect-securityenviromnent-hagel-says/ (noting Secretary of Defense Hagel's warning of security risks of climate
change).
See generally Andrew Shepherd et al., Mass Balance ofthe Antarctic Ice Sheetfrom 1992 to 2017,
558 NATURE 219,219-222 (2018).
51 See, e.g., Claire Asher, Climate Change is Disruptingthe Birds and the Bees, BBC FUTURE (Aug.
8, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20 170808-climate-change-is-disrupting-the-birds-and50

the-bees (exploring the effects of climate change from the frequency of extreme weather events to
reproductive fertility).
See, e.g., Christa Marshall, Bill Gates-Led FundMakes First 'Breakthrough'Investments, E&E
NEWS (June 12, 2018),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/06/12/stories/1060084201
52

(discussing plans of the Breakthrough Energy Ventures (BEV) fund, formedby Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos
and others to capitalize on zero-emissions technologies, with particular focus on grid-scale storage);
Jeffrey Tomich, ConsumersEnergy Bets Big on Solar as it Dumps Coal, E&E NEWS (June 14, 2018),
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/06/14/stories/1060084449
(explaining the move of

Michigan utility companies to increase solar in the mix of energy sources and reduction of coal).
53 See Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable
GenerationCapacity, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10591, 10592 (2017).
54 See Christa Marshall, Trump Announces New Solar Tarifs, E&E NEWS (June 15, 2018).

http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2018/06/15/stories/1060084727

(explaining how new tariffs on

Chinese made diodes for semiconductor devices for solar cells amounts to an additional twenty-five
percent traffic in addition to tariffs imposed on the global solar industry in January 2018).
55

See Chelsea Harvey, C02 Can Sharpen Extreme Weather Without Higher Temps, E&E NEWS (June
21, 2018), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/06/21/stories/1060085723.
56 Radley Horton et al., The Climate Risks We Face, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
http://nyti.ms/2hKf6JG.
5 CSSR 2017 REPORT, supra note 43.
ss Id. at 13.
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common due to this warming trend, could cost the United States $1.1 trillion.5 9
These scientific findings, therefore, "create an unusual situation in which the
government's policies are in direct opposition to the science it is producing.""o
IV. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO
UNREASONABLE RISKS
The Trump administration's rejection of the science relating to climate
change is its most prominent position relating on agency process and science.'
Despite the long history of science as the necessary basis for regulatory decisions,
the current administration has de-emphasized science, rejecting scientific
conclusions, and refraining costs and benefits as subjective judgments. 62 President
Trump's rejection of the Paris Agreement means the U.S. will fall farther behind
its commitment to cut greenhouse gases.63 President Trump has appointed people
to positions of authority in agencies despite clear antipathy for the mission of the
agency involved.6 4 For example, President Trump nominated Rick Perry to the
position of Secretary of Energy despite Perry's early claim that the agency should
be abolished.6 ' Trump's nomination of Scott Pruitt, the now-former Administrator

9

Id. at 12.
Lisa Friedman & Glenn Thrush, U.S. Report Says Humans Cause Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 3, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2hDdlbG (noting that Trump administration not getting information

60

from "their own scientist").
See Scott Waldman, Steve Miloy Doesn'tLike 'Climate Bedwetters, 'E&E NEWS (June 12, 2018),
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060084153/ (noting that Milloy, EPA transition official
61

and former Murray Energy executive, sees science asjunk science and rejects scientists as politically
motivated, noting that the "left has tried to make me radioactive for 25 years"); see also Coral
Davenport, In the Trump Administration, Science Is Unwelcome. So Is Advice., N.Y. TIMEs, June 9,

2018, at Al (noting that President Trump rejected advice of a White House science adviser or senior
counselor trained in nuclear physics in preparing for meeting with Kim Jong-un of North Korea).
62 See Ari Natter, Cost of Trump's Power Plan? Priceless, Like Freedom, Perry Says, BLOOMBERG

LAW NEWS (June 28, 2018), http://bnanews.bna.com/enviromnent-and-energy/cost-of-trumps-

power-plan-priceless-like-freedom-perry-says (reporting that Perry declares plan to keep old,
unprofitable plants running on the basis that they serve national security).
63 See Jim Efstathiou Jr., U.S. to Miss Obama-Era Climate Goal as Trump Dismantles Policies,
BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (June 28, 2018), http://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/us-to-

miss-obama-era-climate-goal-as-trump-dismantles-policies
research firm Rhodium Group LLC).

(citing report released June 27 by

64 See Lisa Heinzerling,

Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump's
DeregulatoryBinge, 12 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 13 (2018) (noting that "many agencies are being

guided by political personnel who have come straight from jobs as lobbyists for the industries they
will be deregulating," and concluding that "a central goal of the Trump administration is
deconstruction of the administrative state").
65 See generally Steven Mufson & Sean Sullivan, Rick Perry Expresses 'Regret'forPledging to
Abolish Energy Department, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), http://wapo.st/2jB7zyO (quoting Perry as

regretful of his campaign promise in 2012 to abolish the agency).
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of the EPA, was likely prompted by the fact that Pruitt had been a vocal opponent
and frequently filed lawsuits against the EPA.6 6
Trump policy changes have predictable effects on the market responses to
environmental threats.17 For example, the administration has proposed subsidies
for failing coal plants and nuclear plants and instructed the Department of Energy
to take "immediate steps" to require grid operators to buy electricity from coal and
nuclear sources, citing a need for emergency resources.6 s Grid operators and other
opponents to the subsidies contest the dramatic need for backup sources and argue
that a carbon tax would move the market toward renewable energy.69 Market
forces may push toward renewable energy despite the Trump administration's
efforts to destroy the Clean Power Plan.70
The administration's efforts are marked by both slow-downs and speedy
action. Delaying finalized regulations brings the expected result of weaker
environmental protections. 7 ' The Trump administration emphasizes the need to
accommodate businesses and reduce the time required for environmental reviews,
implementing a key strategy of reviewing, delaying, and softening environmental

regulations.72
At the other end of the spectrum, fast action is the Trump Administration's
approach to facilitating industry and business interests despite the effects on the
environment. 73
An Executive Order entitled "Establishing Discipline and
66

See Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruittas EP.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2017, at

A14 (reporting confirmation of Pruitt to head EPA despite being a "seasoned legal opponent of the
agency"). Similarly, Trump appointed Mick Mulvaney acting head of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau despite Mulvaney's caustic criticism of the agency. See Gregory Korte, What does
Mulvaney's Appointment Mean for the Future of CFPB?, USA

TODAY

(Nov. 28, 2017)

http://usat.ly/2iZvkiz (reporting Mulvaney's disdain for CFPB and his statement that he sees the
bureau as ajoke "in a sick, sad way").
See, e.g., Benjamin Storrow, Solar Growing More Slowly with Trump Tariffs, E&E NEWS (June
18, 2018), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/06/18/stories/1060084835; Adam Aton, Did
Trump Just Propose the Opposite of Pricing Carbon?, E&E NEWS (June 4, 2018),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060083347.
68 Brad Plumer, Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear Plants, N.Y. TIMES, June
1, 2018, at A17.
69 Id.; see also Jennifer Dloughy, Trump Prepares Lifeline for Money-Losing Coal Plants,
BLOOMBERG (May
31, 2018, 7:49 PM), http://www.blooniberg.com/news/articles/2018-0667

0 1/trump-said-to-grant-lifeline-to-money-losing-coal-power-plants-jhv94ghl.
See Robert Glicksman, The Fate of the Clean Power Plan in the Trump Era, 11 CARBON
L. REv. 292, 293 (2017) (predicting that electric generating will move away from coal as a
&

70

CLIMATE

matter of market forces unless Congress preempts state regulation).
71 See, e.g., Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 13968 (Mar. 16, 2017) (delaying the

effective date of the RMP Amendments rule until February 19, 2019; subsequently vacated by an
August 17, 2018, D.C. Circuit decision).
72 See generally Juliet Eilperin, Trump Signs Executive Order to Expand Drilling off America's
Coasts: 'We're Opening It Up. ', WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), http://wapo.st/2qeRZfR.
73 See Carol J. Miller, ForA Lump of Coal & A Drop of Oil: An Environmentalist'sCritique of the
Trump Administration'sFirstYear ofEnergy Policies, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 185, 203 (2018) (detailing

the administration's efforts to expedite reviews and approvals to "strengthen our economic platform
and create jobs"). Among the numerous examples of streamlining of projects are uranium mining
projects near the Grand Canyon, which have not have not slowed to allow consideration of risks to
water sources and wildlife. See Maya L. Kapoor, A New Era of Uranium Mining Near the Grand
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Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for
Infrastructure," indicates the preference for speed in environmental reviews of
industry projects. 74 It states: "More efficient and effective Federal infrastructure
decisions can transform our economy, so the Federal Government, as a whole,
must change the way it processes environmental reviews and authorization
decisions."7 5 This Executive Order seeks to speed environmental permitting
reviews of infrastructure projects to complete environmental reviews within a twoyear period.76 Similarly, President Trump's Executive Order 13771 directs
executive departments or agencies to "identify at least two existing regulations to
be repealed" whenever it proposes a new regulation unless prohibited by law.
This move seems aimed at "undermin[ing] the ability of federal agencies to carry
out their science-based missions to protect public health, safety, and the
environment." 7 ' Gretchen Goldman and other scientists in the Union of Concerned
Scientists pointed out the problem with this approach:
Federal science agencies are charged with carrying out laws, such as the
Clean Air Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the
Endangered Species Act, which require rules be issued based on
scientific evidence of a need. When an air pollutant is at levels not
protective of public health, when workers face occupational risks, and
when a species requires protection, agencies are required to issue new
rules. "Each regulation must be judged on its own merits." Thus, a
requirement that agencies remove two rules to issue a new one would
require them to break the laws they are charged with implementing.7 1
Canyon?: With Scant Dataon Risk, Republicans Push to Open a 'Perfect'IMiningOpportunity, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (June 12, 2018), http://www.hcn.org/issues/50.1 1/energy-and-industry-a-new-era-

of-uranium-mining-near-the-grand-canyon

(noting concerns

of federal scientists and local

communities that the federal government will overturn the moratorium on uranium mining in the

Colorado Plateau).
Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process

74

for Infrastructure Projects, Exec. Order No. 13807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40463 (Aug, 15, 2017).
7 Id
76

Id

7

Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9341 (Feb. 3, 2017).

The current administration's agenda focuses on rolling back Obama era regulations as well as earlier
policies. These include, among others: Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on
Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National
Environmental Policy Act Reviews, 81 Fed. Reg. 51866 (Aug. 5, 2016); Memorandum, President

Barack Obama, Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and Encouraging
Related Private Investment (Nov. 3, 2015); Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate
Change, Exec. Order 13653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66817 (Nov. 1, 2013) (directing federal agencies to prepare
for the environmental impacts of climate change) (the current administration eliminated data.gov
portals which provided climate change data); Memorandum, President Barack Obama, Power Sector
Carbon Pollution Standards (June 25, 2013) (directing EPA to establish carbon pollution standards
for power plants no later than June 30, 2016); Memorandum, President Barack Obama, Climate
Change and National Security (Sept. 21, 2016) (directing the federal government to consider the
impacts of climate change on national security related policies); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
PRESIDENT'S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN JUNE 2013 (2013); ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CLIMATE
ACTION PLAN: STRATEGY TO REDUCE METHANE EMisSIONS (2014).
7'

Goldman et al., supra note 19.

7 Id.
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Former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt's statement that humans are "not
the primary drivers of climate change" gave rise to calls for the scientific basis for
the claim."o Pruitt resisted giving evidence to back up this claim on climate change
despite the holding by the District Court for the District of Columbia that Pruitt
must reveal the (scientific) evidence for his claims." Pruitt's failure to be
transparent with the evidence behind his claims caused widespread concern among
the scientific community. In addition, actions taken by the Trump administration
to reopen and challenge the endangerment finding, which allows EPA to regulate
greenhouse gases, also creates a lack of trust in current leadership.82 The former
Administrator has fundamentally undercut the role of science in scientific research
relating to climate change. For example, on April 30, 2018, the EPA proposed a
rule titled, "Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science."83 Stating that the
document "proposes a regulation intended to strengthen the transparency of
regulatory science,"8 4 the proposed regulation provides that when EPA
"develops regulations, including regulations for which the public is likely to bear
the cost of compliance, with regard to those scientific studies that are pivotal to the
action being taken, the EPA should ensure that the data underlying those are
publicly available in a manner sufficient for independent validation."" The
proposed change in policy will limit agency use of scientific studies to those in
which scientists make the raw data of their research available to the public. 6
Opponents of the new policy argue that it will limit the use of scientific research
because studies concerned with public health generally promise anonymity to the
participants and the reservation of agency power in the policy could operate to
favor industries. 7
Despite the effect of regulations on the growing threat of climate
disruption, the Trump administration embraces restrictions that provide a free card
to industry to proceed with minimal regulation." The EPA recently published a
notice of proposed rulemaking entitled "Increasing Consistency and Transparency
in Considering Costs and Benefits in the Rulemaking Process," suggesting an
approach that changes the traditional cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decisions
that affect public health and environmental protections.89 Former Administrator
Pruitt, stating that the Obama administration overestimated the benefits of rules
See Scott Waldman, Judge to EPA: Show Your Science, E&E NEWS (June 5, 2018),
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/06/05/stories/1060083483.
81 Id.
80

82 See id.
83 Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18768 (June 28, 2018).
84
85

Id.
Id.

86 See Corbin Hiar, PruittScience Plan May Block Use ofMajor HarvardStudy, E&E NEWS (June

18, 2018), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060084931/.
87

Id.

Scott Waldman, PruittSignals an Embrace of Industry Researchers, E&E NEWS: CLIMATE WIRE
(Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/11/01/stories/1060065271 (noting move to
8

kill bill that would block dangerous chemicals in children's toys).
8 Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the Rulemaking
Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 27524 (June 7, 2018).
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and underestimated the costs for industry compliance with rules, explained: "This
action is the next step toward providing clarity and real-world accuracy with
respect to the impact of the Agency's decisions on the economy and the regulated
community."9 0 The advanced notice of proposed rulemaking states, "EPA is
requesting comments regarding perceived inconsistency and lack of transparency
in how the Agency considers costs and benefits in rulemaking, potential
approaches for addressing these concerns, and the scope for issuing regulations to
govern EPA's approach in future rulemakings." 9 1
Additionally, Pruitt made significant changes to the members of the EPA's
Science Advisory Boards ("SAB").92 A new directive applying to all SABs and
subcommittees prohibits SAB members from receiving government grants for
their research and requiring current board members to abandon their grant-funded
research if they wish to stay on an SAB. 93 While Pruitt argues that members
receiving grants are not independent, he fails to acknowledge the fact that many of
the new SAB members and candidates are employed by (or connected to)
industries regulated by the EPA. Some finalists considered for SAB positions have
indicated conclusions contrary to broadly accepted scientific conclusions. For
example, SAB member finalist Stanley Young said, "Ifair pollution was a killer,
it would be killing everywhere, and the fact that we have established that it's not
killing in California puts every other paper at risk for the claims that they have
made." 9 4 Additionally, Young has failed to disclose that the American Petroleum
Institute funded the study he cites. 95

Public trust in government and the cooperation of the governed is possible
only when the objective power of science assures the public of truthful regulation.
As the ability of science to impact policy increases .

.

. the temptation

also increases for political, ideological, and financial interests to
manipulate or suppress inconvenient data. When science is undermined
in such a manner, the public is left with laws and regulations that
inadequately meet the needs of citizens. 96
Concerns about using science as a cover for agency judgments emphasizes
the need for accountability of agencies and the other values of administrative law,
such as participation of the public and transparency and agency judgment that
depend on science and the good faith melding of science and policy. 97 Science's
90 Dino Grandoni & Chris Mooney, EPA to Review How ItAdds Up the Economic Pros and Cons of

EnvironmentalRules, WASH. POST (June 7, 2018), http://wapo.st/2sPezuL.
91 83 Fed. Reg. 27524, 27527 (2018).
92 See Waldman, supra note 87.
93
Memorandum from Scott Pruitt, EPA Administrator, on Strengthening and Improving Membership
on EPA Federal Advisory Committees (Oct. 31, 2017).
94 Waldman, supra note 87.
95Id.
96 Goldman et al., supra note 19, at 268.
9 See Emily Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and JudicialReview as Translation
ofAgency Science, 109 MICH. L. REv. 733, 734-36 (2011) (voicing concern that agency science,
"laced with policy decisions at numerous levels" is "susceptible to misuse").
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susceptibility to misuse is not trivial, and the balance is important for actual health
and safety of the public. Erosion of the public's trust in the role of agencies as
honest brokers of the balance of costs and benefits could undermine the trust of the
public in government itself Even political destabilization is a possible outcome

of the climate disruption.98 Knowing the difference between natural laws and
human deals is crucial to understanding the public good in the context of
environmental regulations. Concerns about agency "capture" by the regulated
industry lead to disillusionment of the public.99 Trust in the government ebbs and
flows,oo but one telling sign of loss of the administrative accountability is the loss
of science.
V. CONCLUSION
Government decisions affect both the public welfare and individual
interests, often in dramatic ways, and governments must respond as a matter of
necessity to issues of survival. If we could amend or overrule the laws of nature
by a popular vote or a declared winner of a debate, such protection would be
unnecessary; human preferences would prevail. But the laws of nature operate
separately from politics and human preferences. Airplanes stay in the sky because
science revealed the principles of flight and engineers followed them. We know
that a spirited debate between the red team and the blue team will not change the
facts of scientific principles. When the effects of scientific reality are not as readily
apparent as airplanes falling out of the sky, however, we can lose track of the
seriousness of the laws of nature. The laws of science are not "deals" in the sense
of bargains between individuals. Because the physical laws of nature are
implacable and beyond the reach of bargaining, getting the facts wrong can mean
disaster. People cannot set or amend the laws of nature. Survival is based on
discovering and complying with such laws. Science is the means of that discovery
and, thus, the means of human survival. Survival depends on good decisions at
the nexus of science and policy in assessing and managing unreasonable risks.
Relying on science does not always mean that agency decisions are
optimal or accurate. The concepts of "safe" and "dangerous" may be debatable in
particular cases, and agencies can make ill-advised judgments. Even with good
faith scientists and agencies, errors of fact and judgment are always possible. The
more dangerous defect is an agency's disregard or distortion of science because
any decision made without regard for science is inherently flawed. To the extent
that agencies overstate the science, decisions are necessarily flawed and outcomes
9

See Libby Plummer & Cara McGoogan, 11 Terrifying Climate Change Facts in 2017,

WIRED,

(July 31, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/climate-change-facts (citing United Nations report
that 21.5 million people have been displaced from their home since 2008 due to climate changedrelated weather hazards).
* See Sidney Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Use andAbuse ofInformation: Capture,Accountability, and
RegulatoryMetrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1745 (2008) (arguing for performance accountability in

regulation).
100
See Gary Dreyzin, The Environment UnderA Trump Presidency:LookingAhead by Looking Back
to the Reagan Administration, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (2016) (predicting that people who

acknowledge manmade climate change have much to fear under the Trump Presidency).
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are at risk. A deeper and more damaging problem arises when the power of science
is denied or rejected. In such a situation, we can say with high confidence negative
outcomes are likely.
Distorting or disregarding the facts that science discovers can mean that
airplanes fall from the skies, cancers thrive despite the well-intentioned but poorly
researched chemotherapy regimens, and crops rot or bum in the field. In contrast
to legislators and policy makers, nature is immune to the blandishments of
argumentation or profit. Lobbying is fruitless in the forum of physical reality.
There is no system of appeal in this forum and no basis for rehearing or pleas for
leniency. In categories often found in legal analysis, science is the necessary
predicate for good outcomes, though it may not be the sufficient predicate for good
outcomes.
The scientific consensus on climate disruption reveals a high level of
certainty that imminent physical threats are the result of historic and continuing
government support for a carbon economy. The foundational justification for
government-protection of people and society-calls for government
responsibility in addressing the threat of climate disruption. Principles of risk
assessment have evolved over generations of increasingly sophisticated science.
The art of legislation and policymaking depends on understanding the relationship
of science and policy. In other words, some accommodation of costs and benefits
must necessarily fall to decision makers. The art of legislation and policymaking
is legitimated by its foundation on truth as established by science. This is an art,
but not a dark art-unless the process distorts or ignores objective reality and
reliable science. When the ultimate policy choice discards the foundation of reality
as it is assessed by honest science, disasters ensue. The reality of disaster may not
be apparent within a news cycle or a political cycle. Seen in the stark terms of
gambling, political decision makers may draw the line in a place science would
not. In this way, policy is a trump card over science. Even so, nature holds the
ultimate trump card. Realizing this, decision makers acting in good faith give
science its due.
An administrative agency that disregards relevant scientific information
betrays the legislative mandate and the responsibility for government to act in the
public interest. In so doing, it renders the legislative basis for its authority a breach
of trust to the people. A deal maker who misrepresents or disregards material facts
produces a deal that is actionable as a fraud or voidable as a misrepresentation. A
government agency that disregards the facts of science or fails to assess the science
in good faith produces regulatory action that is a fraud on the people.

